Missouri Skipped the Argument Everyone Else Is Having and Went Straight for the Twenty-One-Year-Olds

Catherine Hanaway's six cease-and-desist letters landed on Friday, three days after the CLARITY Act died 49-50 in the Senate and the federal fix for all of this went away until at least November. The interesting move is not that she sent them. It is that her office led with age verification, which is the one theory the Commodity Exchange Act has no clean answer to — and that she named Novig and Underdog while leaving DraftKings and FanDuel alone.

September 18, 2026 at 6:30 PM EDT

6 min read

Every state that has gone after a prediction market has had to pick a fight it could win. Nevada picked the swap question and lost. New York and Connecticut picked it and sued. Arizona picked it and charged a crime. Missouri, on Friday, picked something else entirely.

Attorney General Catherine Hanaway sent cease-and-desist letters to six companies — Kalshi, Polymarket, Robinhood, Crypto.com, Novig and Underdog — ordering them to stop offering sports event contracts to Missourians. Thirty days to comply, per KCTV's account of the letters, or the state moves.

The releasable quote is the one everybody ran: companies "cannot repackage sports bets as 'event contracts' to evade Missouri law." Fine. Every attorney general in this fight has said a version of it. The sentence to look at is the other one, the one her office put in writing: that five of the six "either permit underage users to access their products or lack adequate safeguards" to keep Missourians under 21 out.

That is not a preemption argument. That is the point of it.

Why the age framing is the harder one to answer

Kalshi's defence, everywhere, for eighteen months, has been jurisdictional. The Commodity Exchange Act gives the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over contracts on a designated contract market; a state gambling statute therefore cannot reach the contract. Hanaway contests that directly — her release asserts that federal law "does not preempt state law in this area" and that sports event contracts "do not qualify as 'swaps'" under the CEA, which is the reasoning the Ninth Circuit adopted in KalshiEX v. Assad and applied again on Wednesday.

But notice what the age-verification claim does even if she loses that argument entirely.

Missouri's threshold is 21, set by Amendment 2, which voters passed in November 2024 by 51.3% and which brought the licensed market live on December 1, 2025. A federally regulated futures exchange has no equivalent floor; the CFTC's framework contemplates adults trading derivatives, and its retail-protection architecture is built around disclosure, not age gates. If a Missouri 19-year-old can buy a contract on the Chiefs and cannot place the identical wager at a licensed book fifteen seconds away, that is a fact about the product, not a question about which sovereign regulates it. Preemption can tell you a state may not license a contract market. It is a much longer walk to the claim that a federal commodities statute affirmatively entitles a company to sell sports outcomes to teenagers in a state that voted otherwise.

Whether the underlying allegation is true is a separate matter, and Hanaway's office has asserted it without publishing what it rests on. No test-account results, no screenshots, no methodology. We asked and do not have an answer. The claim is doing a great deal of work in that release and it is currently unevidenced, and an attorney general who wants it taken seriously should show it.

Three days earlier, the federal fix died

The timing is not incidental. On September 15 the Senate voted 49-50 against cloture on the motion to proceed to H.R. 3633 — the CLARITY Act, Roll Call 234. Sixty votes were needed. Republicans hold 53 seats and did not hold them all. Thom Tillis entered a motion to reconsider, which keeps the corpse warm and nothing more; Congress recesses until after November's midterms.

The CLARITY Act is a cryptocurrency bill. Tribes, gaming associations and a bloc of senators had spent weeks warning that its language would implicitly bless sports event contracts, and the fight over that was part of what sank it. The markets themselves are worth watching here: Kalshi and Polymarket priced passage in the 14-20% range in early August and at roughly 8% by Friday. They were never especially confident, and they were right not to be.

So the sequence for the week runs: Monday, the legislative settlement fails. Wednesday, the Ninth Circuit rules against Kalshi under a federal statute. Thursday, the CFTC's staff quietly widens the industry's distribution channel with Letter 26-25. Friday, Missouri sends six letters. There is no coherent federal policy here. There are three federal institutions moving in three directions, and the states have correctly concluded that nobody is coming to settle this.

The two names that are not on the list

Missouri named six companies. It did not name DraftKings or FanDuel, both of which run their own CFTC-regulated prediction products and both of which are licensed Missouri sportsbooks — they were among the six operators that went live on December 1.

There is an obvious benign explanation: the large books have restricted their prediction products largely to states where they do not already hold a betting licence, precisely to avoid this collision, so there may be nothing in Missouri to order stopped. We could not confirm that for Missouri specifically. The attorney general's office did not address it and neither company has said.

But hold the explanation up to the theory. If a sports event contract is unlicensed gambling because of what it is, then it is unlicensed gambling whoever sells it, and the six letters are the beginning of a list. If it is unlicensed gambling because of who sells it — because Kalshi has no Missouri licence and DraftKings does — then the state's real objection is to unlicensed operators, not to event contracts, and the product survives the moment its seller buys a licence. Those are different cases with different endings. Hanaway's release argues the first and her recipient list looks like the second.

The revenue case, and why it is weaker than the AGs want

The quiet motive is money, and Missouri's own local coverage said so a day before the letters went out. The state taxes sports wagering revenue at 10% and earmarks it for education. Prediction-market volume across the sector went from roughly $9 billion in 2024 to more than $40 billion in 2025, and the first week of this NFL season alone moved about $3 billion. A dollar that trades on an exchange is a dollar that is not taxed by Jefferson City.

Now the inconvenient part. Pennsylvania's August sports betting revenue fell 20% year on year and New Jersey's fell 9%, both reported Friday. Those are the numbers an attorney general would love to hang on prediction markets. They do not hang. New Jersey's decline has a mundane explanation sitting right beside it — college football started later this year, which moved a chunk of August handle into September. Pennsylvania's has not been disaggregated at all. Anyone who tells you those figures measure cannibalisation is telling you something they cannot know yet, and we are not going to be the ones who do it. The revenue threat to states is real and structural. The evidence that it has already arrived is not in these two monthly reports.

What happens in thirty days

Almost certainly nothing that resembles compliance. Robinhood's response was that its contracts are "federally regulated by the [CFTC]" through a registered entity. Polymarket's was that prediction markets belong under federal oversight, "not a patchwork of state rules." Neither company is going to fold to a letter, and a cease-and-desist is not an order — it is a notice that the state intends to be taken seriously, and it becomes real only when somebody files.

More than twenty states have now moved against prediction markets since the enforcement wave began in March. The scoreboard is genuinely mixed, which is the entire problem: an industry can operate indefinitely inside a contradiction as long as no single authority can resolve it, and last week demonstrated that none currently can. Congress could not get fifty votes. The circuits disagree. The CFTC's own staff is expanding access in footnotes while its chairman sits through listening sessions.

Missouri's contribution is to have found the argument that does not depend on any of that being resolved. Sell a sports wager to a nineteen-year-old in a state that set the age at twenty-one, and the question of which regulator you answer to becomes a lot less interesting to a jury than the question of what you sold and to whom. If Hanaway can prove the allegation, she has the best state case in the country. If she cannot, she has sent six letters.

Kansas City's KCTV5 on Friday, September 18, reporting the attorney general's crackdown on prediction markets in Missouri.

Editor's note: TrueEdge builds odds tools and earns affiliate commissions from licensed sportsbooks, which compete directly with the prediction-market exchanges discussed here. This piece argues that a state's enforcement theory against those exchanges is stronger than the theories that preceded it. Weigh the conflict.